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Note
International Extradition, the Principle of
Specialty, and Effective Treaty Enforcement
Kenneth E. Levitt
On September 2, 1985, a grand jury indicted Joel Davis for
mail fraud, interstate transportation in aid of racketeering, conspiracy to murder an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent,
and tax fraud.' Immediately after the indictment of his co-conspirator, but before his own indictment, Davis moved to Israel.2
At the request of the United States government, Israel extradited Davis to the United States. 3 The charges listed in the extradition order were mail fraud, arson (the Israeli court's
interpretation of the racketeering charge), and conspiracy to
murder an IRS agent.4 The extradition order did not list the
5
charge of tax fraud.
Davis was convicted of mail fraud and racketeering and
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to murder.6 Although he was not
convicted of tax fraud, the sentencing memorandum which the
judge considered did mention the tax fraud charges. 7 Davis appealed, contending that the judge had taken the tax charges
into account in setting the sentence.8 He argued that because
Israel did not extradite him to face trial for tax fraud, the
United States could not punish him for tax fraud.9
1. United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 183-84 (4th Cir. 1992). The
charges of mail fraud and racketeering were based on an episode in which Davis fraudulently collected insurance proceeds after hiring an arsonist to burn
Davis's summer bungalow colony. Id. at 184. The IRS agent Davis was con-

spiring to kill had discovered Davis's arson scheme and illegal accounting practices. I&

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

I&
Id.
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I&
IdId. at 186.
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Because extradition' ° is not a part of customary international law," a state must extradite only when obliged by treaty
to do so. 12 Under the "principle of specialty,' 3 a state which
has received a criminal defendant 14 pursuant to an extradition
treaty15 may try the defendant only for those offenses for
10. Extradition is "the surrender by one nation to another of an individual
accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender." Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
The requirement that the requesting state have jurisdiction to prescribe
and to adjudicate is most easily and directly satisfied when the offense was
committed in the requesting state. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 475 cmt. d (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
11. 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

INTERNATIONAL

EXTRADITION:

UNITED

STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 319 (2d rev. ed. 1987). Under customary international law, a duty to extradite exists only for some international crimes. Id. at
32. Examples include war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 315 &

n.97 (4th ed. 1990).
12. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933); see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 10, § 475 cmt. a (stating that extradition is not required by customary international law). As early as 1840, a
majority of Supreme Court justices recognized that there is no duty to extradite except as established by treaty. Both Chief Justice Taney and Justice
Thompson indicated that there is no obligation to surrender an individual in
the absence of a treaty. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840)
(Taney, C.J., plurality opinion); id. at 582-83 (Thompson, J., separate opinion).
Although there is no duty to extradite in the absence of a treaty, except
for certain international crimes, see supra note 11, other legal bases for extradition include reciprocity, comity, and national legislation. 1 BASIOUNI, supra
note 11, at 40. Treaties and international law regarding some crimes also serve
as legal bases for extradition. Id. at 319. In the United States, defendants may
be extradited only pursuant to a treaty. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 (1988); see also
Valentine v. United States ex reL Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 8-9 (1936) (stating that
the judicial and executive branches cannot extradite without authority expressly conferred by treaty or statute).
13. Specialty is also spelled "speciality."
14. Criminal defendants subject to extradition proceedings are often
termed "fugitives." Defendants subject to extradition proceedings may be in
custody, in flight, or living openly in a known location while resisting the extradition request. See John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1455-56 (1988). Therefore, this Note uses the
general term "defendant."
15. As a matter of domestic law, the principle of specialty also applies to
extradition not granted pursuant to a treaty. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen. of the
United States, 462 F.2d 475, 479-80 (2d Cir.) (holding that specialty applies to
proceedings against a defendant whose extradition was an act of comity of the
surrendering state), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972); see also United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419 (1886) (explaining that a surrendering state which
extradites in the absence of a treaty could not be expected to deliver the defendant without some limitation on the requesting state's authority to prosecute the defendant); cf Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 320 (1907) (holding
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which he or she was extradited.16 Most extradition treaty violathat specialty applies to proceedings conducted pursuant to an extradition
treaty, even if the treaty does not explicitly incorporate the principle of spe-

cialty). But ci. United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding
that specialty does not apply when the defendant was not delivered to the U.S.
authorities after formal extradition).
Because this Note addresses whether defendants should have standing in
a United States court to protest a violation of the principle of specialty, it deals
almost exclusively with cases in which the United States is the requesting
state. In a small number of cases, however, defendants have attempted to
bring challenges based on specialty in United States courts when the United
States was the surrendering state. These claims have arisen both before and
after the defendants were extradited.
If the United States has not yet extradited the defendant, by definition
the principle of specialty, which restricts the prosecutorial latitude of the requesting state, has not been violated. A ruling by a court of the surrendering
state which attempts to restrict the courts of the requesting state is irrelevant.
See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir.) (explaining that such rulings "can only be advisory in character"), cert dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973).
The most a court can do is ensure that the offenses are extraditable. See infra
note 27 (explaining the requirement of extraditability).
If the United States has already extradited the defendant, the executive
branch is responsible for ensuring that the requesting state complies with the
principle of specialty. 4 MCHAEL ABBELL & BRUNO A. RIsTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASsIsTANCE § 13-2-2 (1990). Domestic United States law will
not create rights which defendants can enforce in the courts of the requesting
state, and defendants cannot protest a violation of specialty by the requesting
state in a United States court. See Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1198
(D.D.C. 1979).
Of course, in cases in which the United States is the surrendering state,
the defendant may still be able to protest a violation of specialty by the requesting state in that state's courts, depending on that state's laws.
16. Defendants may be tried only for the offenses with which they were
charged in their extradition proceedings until they have had time to return to
the states from which they were extradited. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430. "The
'principle of specialty' reflects a fundamental concern of governments that
persons who are surrendered should not be subject to indiscriminate prosecution by the receiving government, especially for political crimes." Fiocconi,
462 F.2d at 481. The principle of specialty also forbids unauthorized re-extradition from the requesting state to a third state, United States ex rel. Donnelly v.
Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1934), and limits the penalty which can be
imposed. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 10, § 477 cmt. f
(death penalty); see also In re Reinitz, 39 F. 204, 208-09 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889)
(holding that specialty protected the defendant, who had been arrested pending trial of the action, from civil suit). But cf Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486
U.S. 517, 525 (1988) (holding that even if specialty precluded civil service of
process, an order denying dismissal on the grounds of immunity was not immediately appealable). See generally RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 10, §§ 475-78 (discussing specialty); 4 ABBELL & RisTAU, supra note
15, § 13-6-2 (same); 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 359-71 (same); MANUEL R.
GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 126-33
(1956) (same); Jonathan George, Note, Toward a More PrincipledApproach to
the Principle of Specialty, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 309 (1979) (discussing the
standing of individuals to raise specialty challenges); Christopher J. Morvillo,
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tions claimed by individuals are for violations of the principle
of specialty.
In Davis's case, the United States would have violated the
principle of specialty and hence the treaty by trying or punishing Davis for any crimes other than those for which he was extradited. 17 If Israel had protested the treaty violation, the
United States, as a matter of international law, would have
been obliged to comply with the treaty.18
This Note addresses whether individuals have standing in
United States courts to protest violations of extradition treaties
and seek dismissal of all charges other than those for which
they were extradited. It also discusses the standard courts
should use to determine whether specialty has been violated.
Two doctrines are relevant. The positivist doctrine dictates that
only the ratifying states themselves may enforce the treaty obligations unless the states have explicitly agreed otherwise. A
natural law approach, on the other hand, views the treaty
rights as inuring both to the surrendering state and to the
individual.
This Note attempts to bridge the conceptual gap between
the two doctrines. Part I explores the principle of specialty and
the bases for the doctrine. Part II critiques the reasoning of
court opinions addressing a defendant's standing to protest violations of the specialty doctrine. It also discusses the standards
used by courts for determining compliance with specialty. Part
Note, Individual Rights and the Doctrine of Speciality: The Deteriorationof
United States v. Rauscher, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 987 (1991) (same).
17. The extradition treaty between-the United States and Israel specifies

that:
A person extradited under the present Convention shall not be
detained, tried or punished in the territory of the requesting Party for
any offense other than that for which extradition has been granted
nor be extradited by that Party to a third State unless:
1. He has left the territory of the requesting Party after his extradition and has voluntarily returned to it;
2. He has not left the territory of the requesting Party within 60
days after being free to do so; or
3. The requested Party has consented to his detention, trial,
punishment or extradition to a third State for an offense other than
that for which extradition was granted.
These stipulations shall not apply to offenses committed after the
extradition.
Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, U.S.-Isr., art. XIII, 14 U.S.T. 1707,
1712.
18. The Davis court declined to decide the specialty issue, holding instead
that Davis had waived the defense by failing to raise it. United States v. Davis,
954 F.2d 182, 186-87 (4th Cir. 1992).
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III proposes a framework for determining whether defendants
have standing and whether specialty has been violated. Part III
maintains that extradition will function effectively only if
courts treat specialty as a right of both defendants and surrendering states. This Note argues that even if individuals are objects, not subjects, of international law,19 allowing individuals
to enforce the agreements made by the states is the best way to
ensure that international law is enforced.
I.
A.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXTRADITION

THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Courts disagree about the theoretical position of individuals
in international law. Courts that take a narrow view of the
rights and obligations arising from a treaty are unlikely to find
that states or individuals have rights or protections other than
those listed in the treaty. Hence, under this view, when the
terms of a treaty do not explicitly give individuals enforcement
power, individuals lack standing. This is the positivist approach. On the other hand, courts that view treaties as embodying a comprehensive set of rights and obligations flowing to all
involved parties likely will allow an individual to enforce the
treaty's terms. This is a natural law approach.
The positivist doctrine derives from the old, dominant
tenet of absolute state sovereignty. 20 It maintains that all international law must be positive law, created either by treaty or
custom, and that international law applies only to states.2 1 The
positivist doctrine stands for the proposition that individuals
are objects, not subjects, of international law and thus cannot
derive rights directly from it.22 Of course, states could create a
19. Unlike an "object," a "subject" of international law has an international legal personality- A subject has international rights and duties and the

ability to operate on the international level. Although individuals, as objects
of international law, may be the beneficiaries of international law, international law historically has not applied to them. See BROWNLIE, supra note 11,

at 58-70; D.W. GRFiG, INTERNATIONAL LAw 115-17 (2d ed. 1976).
20. See GARCfA-MoRA, supra note 16, at 7.
21. See J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-24 (10th

ed. 1989).
22. See GARCIA-MORA, supra note 16, at 7. Positive law directly results
from treaties and customary international law. The positivist doctrine became
dominant in the 18th century. Some positivists deny the existence of a natural
law of nations. 1 L. OPPENHEM, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 56 (H. Lauterpacht
ed., 8th ed. 1955). The influence of the positivist doctrine on international law
is currently on the decline. Karen Parker & Lyn B. Neylon, Jus Cogens:
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positive rule which granted individuals enforceable rights. 2s
Natural law is the converse of positive law. It views
humans as reasonable beings guided by universal senses of justice.24 Naturalists maintain that there is no positive law of nations because all international law is but a part of natural law.as
Under a natural law approach, individuals are subjects of international law. 26 Hence, under natural law, individuals have enforceable rights.
B.

SPECIALTY

In general, extradition has five substantive elements: reciprocity, double criminality, extraditable offenses, specialty, and
non-inquiry. 27 The principle of specialty allows requesting
Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
411, 422 (1989).
23. The positivist doctrine posits that a state may limit its absolute sovereignty. GREIG, supra note 19, at 4. For example, some recent international
agreements grant standing to individuals to protest human rights violations.
See STARKE, supra note 21, at 63-65.
Because the duty to extradite is not part of customary international law,
states that adopt a positivist view maintain that they are not obliged to comply
with any procedures other than those in the applicable treaty. As a matter of
international law, extradition procedures regarded as customary international
law do not create rights enforceable by defendants. M. CHERIF BAssIouNi, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PuBLIc ORDER 50-51 (1974). There
are no aspects of extradition law to which defendants may insist that either
the requesting or surrendering states adhere. Id Hence, defendants do not, as
a matter of customary international law, have standing to protest violations of
specialty.
24. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 26 (6th rev. ed. 1992).
Natural law, which was initially closely intertwined with theology and was
dominant in the 17th and 18th centuries, has been gaining followers in the
20th century. See STARKE, supra note 21, at 22-23; VON GLAHN, supra, at 33
(referring to "principles of justice and general principles of law"). In the 19th
and 20th centuries, secular natural law became predominant over ecclesiastical
natural law. Parker & Neylon, supra note 22, at 421.
25. See 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 22, § 55.
26. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 16, at 13-14.
27. 1 BASSIOuNI, supra note 11, at 320. These "stringent protections have
been included in international extradition treaties... because systems of justice may vary widely between treaty signatories." Brief for Amicus Curiae
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights at 9, United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (No. 90-50459), cert granted, 112 S.
Ct. 857 (1992).
Reciprocity is either similarity between the processes of the two states or
mutual recognition of their respective processes. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 11,
at 321. It is a precondition to extradition. Id. at 324.
The rule of double criminality requires that the offense charged be criminal under the laws of both the surrendering and requesting states. Id. The
name and "scope of liability" need not be the same for the two offenses, but
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states to try or punish defendants only for the offenses for
the "particular act charged" must be "criminal in both jurisdictions." Collins
v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922). Thus, the surrendering state need not extradite a defendant if it does not consider the conduct in question to have been
criminal. 1 BAssiouNI, supra note 11, at 325-26. Because courts generally attempt to construe the act in question as criminal, however, this rule !as been
so weakened that courts consider the requirement to be met if the offense
with which the requesting state intends to charge the defendant is roughly the
same as an offense in the surrendering state. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290
U.S. 276, 293 (1933) (holding that although the conduct was not criminal in the
state in which the defendant was found, the fact that the conduct was criminal
in other states indicated that the nation's jurisprudence recognized the conduct as criminal, and stating that extradition treaties "should be liberally construed"); of McElvy v. Civiletti, 523 F. Supp. 42, 48 (S.D. Fla. 1981) ("[Courts
must approach challenges to extradition with a view towards finding the offenses within the treaty."); see also Kester, supra note 14, at 1462 n.116 (listing
marginal cases in which the courts found offenses sufficiently similar to satisfy
the double criminality requirement).
The requirement of extraditable offenses ensures that the offense for
which the defendant is extradited is itself listed in the extradition treaty. See
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886); Quinn v. Robinson, 783
F.2d 776, 791 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). If the extradition is
pursuant to a treaty, the offense must either be listed in the treaty or derivable from the specified formula as extraditable. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at
328. Extraditable offenses are generally serious crimes, i.e., those punishable
by at least one year in prison. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra
note 10, § 475 cmt. c. Although the requirement that the offense be extraditable is separate from that of double criminality, many courts blur the distinction. Kester, supra note 14, at 1462-63. Courts also sometimes confuse the
distinct requirements of extraditable offenses and specialty. In Davis's case
the requirement of extraditable offenses and the principle of specialty would
provide him with separate arguments. Davis would raise the argument based
on the requirement of extraditable offenses in the surrendering state's courts,
bui he would raise the specialty argument in the requesting state's courts.
First, Davis could argue that tax fraud is not an extraditable offense within
the terms of the extradition treaty with Israel. Davis would make this argu-'
ment during Israel's extradition proceedings because United States courts will
probably not reconsider the surrendering state's decision that the offense is
extraditable. United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 429 (9th Cir.
1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988); McGann v. United States Bd. of Parole, 488 F.2d 39, 40 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert denied, 416 U.S. 958
(1974). If the Israeli courts agreed that tax fraud does not fall within the list
of extraditable offenses, Davis would not be extradited for tax fraud and specialty would preclude the United States, as the requesting state, from trying or
punishing him for tax fraud; if Davis lost the argument, and was extradited for
tax fraud, neither doctrine would prevent the United States from trying him
for tax fraud.
If Davis was not extradited to be charged with tax fraud, it is irrelevant
whether tax fraud is an extraditable offense; specialty prevents the requesting
state from trying or punishing him for it. Davis might be protected by neither
principle (tax fraud is both extraditable and listed in the extradition order),
only one (either the surrendering state holds tax fraud not extraditable and
the requesting state does not subsequently attempt to try or punish him for it,
or if tax fraud is extraditable but not listed in the extradition order, specialty
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which they were extradited. In addition to denying extradition
if one of the substantive requirements is absent, courts deny ex2
tradition based on limited defenses and exemptions. 8
After a long period of dormancy, there has been a sudden
surge of specialty claims raised by defendants. This surge coincides with a sharp rise in the number of extradition requests
made by and of the United States.2 The United States
Supreme Court has not decided an issue relating to the principle of specialty since before World War 1,30 and between then
and the early 1980s only scattered specialty cases arose in the
federal courts. Since 1980, however, there has been a large
number of specialty claims, and for many of the circuits the issue of whether defendants have standing to enforce the extraprecludes the requesting state from trying or punishing him for it) or both
(the surrendering state determines that tax fraud is not extraditable, and specialty prevents a subsequent attempt by requesting state to try or punish him
for tax fraud anyway).
The rule of non-inquiry precludes inquiry by the surrendering state into
the criminal procedures of the requesting state. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at
372; see Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911). No court has ever denied extradition for reasons contrary to the rule of non-inquiry. See Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining
that the evaluation of conditions in the requesting state is a matter solely for
the executive branch). But see Kester, supra note 14, at 1478-82 (asserting that
this exception is widely acknowledged and that a court would likely invoke it
if the State and Justice Departments were to present a case with the appropriate fact situation).
28. Broadly stated, these defenses and exemptions include grounds relating to: the offense, e.g., when the offense is a political crime; the defendant,
e.g., when the defendant has immunity; the procedure, e.g., when the defendant has been tried in absentia or would be subject to double jeopardy;, the penalty, e.g., when the requesting state might subject the defendant to the death
penalty and the surrendering state objects to the death penalty, and expected
human rights violations by the requesting state. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 10, § 476; 1 BAssiOuNi, supra note 11, at 381-496.
In the 18th and early 19th centuries, most defendants were political revolutionaries. By the late 19th century, it was thought inhumane not to grant
asylum to political offenders. Most defendants at this time wei~e common
criminals. VON GLAHN, supra note 24, at 286. The rise of terrorism, however,
has led to recent efforts to narrow the definition of political offenses. Id. at
299.
29. During the 1960s, the United States made and received about 20 extradition requests per year. 4 ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 15, § 13-1-2. By 1978,
the number had reached 100; four years later it was 338. I& In 1987, 572 requests were made and received by the United States. Id
30. The last opinion in which the Court decided an issue of specialty was
Collins v. O'Neil, 214 U.S. 113 (1909). The Court summarily reaffirmed this
holding in Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 511-12 (1915). In 1987, the Court
assumed without deciding that specialty forbade civil service of process on an
extradited defendant. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 525 (1988).
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dition treaty has been a question of first impression. The
resulting body of federal common law is internally inconsistent
and erratically enforced.
1.

Rationales Underlying Specialty

The primary rationale underlying the principle of specialty
is that surrendering states should not be induced to return an
individual under false pretenses. 3 ' Under the principle of specialty, surrendering states may examine the substance of each
charge against the defendant, and may choose to grant extradition for only some of the offenses listed in the extradition request.32 Without the principle of specialty, surrendering states
would have no control over the charges for which requesting
states prosecute defendants, leaving the defendants at the
whim of the requesting state.33 For example, requesting states
would be able to prosecute defendants for political offenses
4
although the extradition request listed only common crimes.3
By ensuring that the processes of the surrendering state
are not abused, specialty protects the surrendering state's sovereignty.as Although defendants may benefit from a successful
challenge to a violation of specialty, the accepted rule is that
specialty protects surrendering states, not defendants.36
31. 1 BAssIoUNI, supra note 11, at 360.
32. 4 ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 15, § 13-6-2; see, e.g., Berenguer v.
Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1196 (D.D.C. 1979) (U.S. State Department permitted
Italy to proceed on only some of the changes for which it had requested an
expansion to the extradition order). States often grant extradition for only
some of the offenses listed in the extradition request. 4 ABBELL & RIsTAu,
supra note 15, § 13-6-2.
33. See 1 BAssIoUNI, supra note 11, at 360. The principle of specialty enables the surrendering state to examine the entire list of offenses with which
the defendant may be charged in order to ensure that the requesting state
complies with the requirements of double criminality and extraditable offenses. Id.; see supra note 27 (defining these two requirements).
34. One of the powers specialty provides surrendering states is the ability
to give up individuals with the assurance that they will be tried only for common crimes, not political offenses. See GARCIA-MORA, supra note 16, at 126.
But cf. Kester, supra note 14, at 1476 (arguing that the political offense exception is glamorous but seldom used).
35. Some courts have held that the principle of specialty applies only
when the surrendering state has formally granted extradition. E.g., United
States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Vreeken, 603 F. Supp. 715, 723 (D. Utah 1984), affd on other grounds, 803 F.2d
1085 (10th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987).
36. See GARCfA-MoRA, supra note 16, at 129-30.
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Exceptions and Limitations to the Principle of Specialty

Despite its unequivocal formulation, several exceptions
narrow the scope of the principle of specialty. Requesting
states may be able to try defendants for lesser included offenses
established by the evidence supporting the defendants' extradition. Provided that the requesting states meet the other substantive requirements, they may also try defendants for
comparable crimes that are established by the facts in the original request.37 In addition, specialty does not apply to crimes
committed after the extradition-s Requesting states may also
try defendants for crimes other than those for which they were
extradited if they fail to leave the country when given the opportunity to do so 39 or voluntarily return to it. 4°
A major limitation on the application of the principle of
specialty is waiver by the surrendering state. Most extradition
treaties negotiated by the United States since 1960 allow the
surrendering state to expand the extradition order, thus permitting requesting states to try defendants for crimes other
than those for which they originally were extradited. 4 ' Courts
have permitted surrendering states to waive specialty even absent such an exception in the treaty.42
The law regarding waivers by individual defendants remains unclear. Some authors argue that allowing defendants to
waive the application of the principle of specialty jeopardizes
the protections afforded to the surrendering state. 43 In many
37. 1 BASsIoUNI, supra note 11, at 364; see also Decorte v. Soci6t6
Anonyme Groupe d' Assurances Nediloyd, 69 I.L.R. 216, 217-18 (Belg. Ct. of
Cassation 1971) (holding that requesting states may charge defendants with offenses not in the extradition request if the facts remain the same and the new
offense is listed in the treaty).
38. Collins v. O'Neil, 214 U.S. 113, 123 (1909).
39. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886); see RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 10, § 477 cmt. e (explaining that treaties
generally specify the period, such as 45 days, during which defendants may
leave the state; specialty no longer protects defendants after the expiration of

this period).
40. See 4 ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 15, § 13-2-4; cf Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64, 68 (1899) (holding that specialty protected a defendant who
returned from Canada for trial after being released on bail).
41.

See 4 ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 15, § 13-2-4. For an example, see

supra note 17 (excerpting the U.S.-Israeli extradition treaty).

42. E.g., United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422-23 (9th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986); United States ex reL Donnelly v.
Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511, 512 (2d Cir. 1935) (explaining that the surrendering
state has complete discretion to withhold asylum for the purpose of reextradition).
43. See, e.g., GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTRADrION LAW 107 (1991)
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instances, however, courts have allowed defendants to waive
the principle of specialty, even over the surrendering state's objections.4 4 These courts' opinions are inconsistent with the positivist notion that specialty protects the surrendering state.48
C. EXTRADITION LAW
Extradition law includes both congressional enactments
and extradition treaties. Extradition treaties resemble other
United States treaties in formation and effect.48 Because they
are self-executing, 47 the judiciary must enforce them as law.48
Most United States extradition treaties currently in force,
(arguing that, while allowing defendants to waive violations of the principle of
specialty "may be a sensible progression, it does seem to go against the spirit of
the principle of specialty which is to treat it as part of the bargain between the
states").
44. GARCfA-MORA, supra note 16, at 128-30. Courts that have allowed defendants to waive a violation, however, have not treated the principle of specialty as granting the defendants rights. Id at 130-31.
45. One court noted:
And again we are gravely told that Mr. Coy has released the government from this solemn declaration by a waiver. Was Mr. Coy a part

of the treaty stipulations with Mexico? Is Mr. Coy able to bind and
unbind the government from its duties and obligations towards the
other nations by any act that he can perform? The statement of the
proposition discloses its absurdity.
Ex parte Coy, 32 F. 911, 917 (W.D. Tex. 1887).
46. Extradition treaties are typically bilateral. See 1 BASSIOUNI, supra
note 11, at 25. The United States has 101 bilateral treaties with foreign countries. 4 ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 15, § 13-2-3. Most other nations also
rely on bilateral extradition treaties. See 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 11, at 31.
Like other United States treaties, extradition treaties are made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2.
47. Treaties are either executory (non-self-executing) or self-executing.
An executory treaty has been ratified, but requires implementing legislation
before it can take effect as domestic law. A self-executing treaty takes effect
as domestic law upon ratification. JOHN E. NowAx Lr AL., CONsTrrTIoNAL
LAW § 6.7 (4th ed. 1986). Extradition treaties are self-executing. 1 BASSIOUNI,
supra note 11, at 40.
48. Extradition treaties are on a par with statutes and the Constitution as
the supreme law of the land. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The judiciary must
enforce self-executing treaties in the same manner as it enforces the Constitution and statutes. A treaty is "'to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of
any legislative provision."' Valentine v. United States ex reL Neidecker, 299
U.S. 5, 10 (1936) (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)).
That extradition treaties are self-executing, however, does not resolve the issue of whether defendants have standing. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 10, § 111 cmt. h ("Whether a treaty is self-executing is a
question distinct from whether the treaty creates private rights or remedies.");
see also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121-22 (1933); Head Money Cases,
112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884).
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and all negotiated within the last one hundred years, incorporate the principle of specialty. 49 None affirmatively grants
standing to defendants. 5°
Congress has not expressly stated whether criminal defendants have standing to protest a violation of the principle of
specialty. Federal extradition statutes5 ' do not invoke the principle of specialty by name, but appear to adopt its precepts regardless of whether the United States is the requesting or
surrendering state. 52 Courts disagree about whether these provisions grant standing to defendants to protest violations of
specialty. 53
49. All extradition treaties negotiated since United States v. Rauscher, 119
U.S. 407 (1886), have included provisions regarding the principle of specialty. 4
ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 15, § 13-2-4. Most extradition treaties negotiated before Rauscher, however, did not expressly incorporate the principle of
specialty. Id- § 13-2-4.
50. While none grants standing, seven treaties negotiated around the turn
of the century allow defendants to waive violations of the principle of specialty. E.g., Treaty on Extradition, Apr. 21, 1900, U.S.-Bol., art. VII, 32 Stat.
1857, 1861 ("No person surrendered by either of the high contracting parties to
the other shall, without his consent, freely granted and publicly declared by
him, be triable or tried or be punished for any crime or offense committed
prior to his extradition, other than that for which he was delivered up .....
51. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1988).
52. For example, Congress has authorized the Secretary of State to order
the extradition of a person to another state to stand trial for the charges for
which extradition was granted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1988). This provision allows the Secretary of State to extradite only for offenses certified by the extradition magistrate. 4 ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 15, § 13-2-2.
After a criminal defendant has been extradited from the United States,
only the Secretary of State has the authority to ensure that the requesting
state complies with the treaty requirements, including the principle of specialty. Id § 13-3-3. The State Department has often demanded that the requesting state abide by the principle of specialty. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 10, § 477, rep. note 2.
In addition, when the United States is the requesting state, Congress has
given the President discretionary power to protect defendants while they are
being tried for the offenses for which extradition was granted. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3192 (1988).
53. In Rauscher, the Court held that the predecessors to the current statutes granted standing to the defendant. 119 U.S. at 423-24. The Court stated
that extradition statutes and the principle of specialty are "a congressional
construction of the purpose and meaning of extradition treaties" and are "conclusive upon the judiciary of the right conferred upon persons brought from a
foreign country into this under such [extradition] proceedings." Id Justice
Gray based his concurrence solely on his belief that the statutes granted the
protections of specialty to the defendant. See id at 433 (Gray, J., concurring).
Subsequent Supreme Court cases are in accord. See Johnson v. Browne, 205
U.S. 309, 317-18 (1907); Cosgrove v. Winney, 174 U.S. 64, 68 (1898) (holding that
"[t]he treaty and statutes secured to" the defendant the benefits of specialty).
The Second Circuit followed this position in 1934, stating that Congress
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II. CRITIQUE OF CURRENT APPROACHES
The question of whether criminal defendants have standing
to protest a violation of the principle of specialty has split the
federal courts. Some courts have allowed the United States to
prosecute defendants despite violations of the principle of specialty. These courts have held either that the surrendering
state did not protest or that the violations were overly technical.5 4 Others have avoided the standing issue entirely by acknowledging the controversy and then deciding against the
defendant on the merits.The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have held that individuals do not have standing to bring claims under the principle
had specifically granted the protection of specialty to the defendant. United
States ex rel Donnelly v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1934). However,
the Second Circuit later backed down from this unequivocal language, stating
that the statutes merely indicate Congress's acknowledgment that the principle of specialty applies when the surrendering state would object to its violation. Fiocconi v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 462 F.2d 475, 482 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
54. See United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the defendant's conviction did not violate specialty because "the Costa Rican
judge apparently inadvertently failed to mention the word 'conspiracy' in his
ruling"); United States v. Rossi, 545 F.2d 814, 815 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam)
(upholding a conviction for trafficking narcotics over an eight-year period,
although the extradition order was granted only for a four-year period, on the
grounds that the surrendering state would not object), cert denied, 430 U.S.
907 (1977); Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 476-77 (upholding a conviction for receiving
heroin, although the extradition order listed only conspiracy to import, on the
grounds that the surrendering state had not and would not object); United
States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding that specialty was not
violated because the surrendering state had not objected and the offense with
which the defendant was charged was not totally unrelated to that for which
he was extradited).
55. See eg., United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 892 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Although the opinions of the District Court for the District of Columbia are
facially inconsistent, compare United States v. Sensi, 664 F. Supp. 566, 570
(D.D.C. 1987) (holding that "it is sound to allow defendant to invoke the doctrine" of specialty), affid on other grounds, 879 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1989) with
Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D.D.C. 1979) (stating that specialty is a privilege of the surrendering state only), the cases can be reconciled
on their facts. In Sensi, in the absence of a waiver, the defendant was challenging in the requesting state's courts a purported violation of specialty by
the requesting state. Sen=4 879 F.2d at 891. In Berenguer, the defendant had
already been extradited and was trying to challenge, in the surrendering
state's court, the surrendering state's expansion of the extradition order. Berenguer, 473 F. Supp. at 1195. In a third district court case, United States v.
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909 (D.D.C. 1988), the court held that the defendant,
Yunis, had no standing. However, Yunis had been seized, not extradited,
hence, under the Ker-Frisbie rule, discussed infra note 68, the treaty was
inapplicable.
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of specialty.- In cases in which the United States is a party,
the United States government also contends that defendants do
not have standing to protest specialty violations.5 7 The Departments of State and Justice take the position that only the surrendering state has the right to object to a violation of an
58
extradition treaty.
The Third, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, on
the other hand, have given defendants standing to object under
the principle of specialty. 59 Some of these courts, however,
56. See United States v. Kaufman, 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.), cert
dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1973).
Shapiro is the case most frequently cited for the proposition that specialty
benefits the states that are party to the extradition treaty, not individuals extradited pursuant to the treaty's provisions. The Shapiro court asserted that
the language of the treaty in question supported this approach by stating that
defendants "shall not be tried 'for any offense other than that for which extradition has been granted,' (emphasis added), rather than for any offenses 'listed
in the Treaty."' Id. at 906 (citations omitted, alteration by the court). A more
plausible interpretation of this language, however, is simply that it imposes
the principle of specialty on the requesting state. The language in the last
clause, which the court used in contrast to the treaty language, is properly
read as an entirely separate substantive requirement-that of extraditable offenses. See also United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962); United
States ex reL Donnelly v. Mulligan, 76 F.2d 511, 513 (2d Cir. 1935) ("Extradition treaties are for the benefit of the contracting parties and are a means of
providing for their social security and protection against criminal acts, and it is
for this reason that rights of asylum and immunity [from the principle of specialty] belong to the state of refuge and not to the criminal."). The Second
Circuit may be reconsidering its position: It recently stated that it did not
need to reach the issue of whether the defendant had standing because specialty did not apply to the facts of the case. United States v. DiTommaso, 817
F.2d 201, 212 n.13 (2d Cir. 1987)
The First and Seventh Circuits, in different contexts, have also denied individuals the right to enforce extradition treaties. See Matta-Ballesteros v.
Henman, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 209 (1990); United
States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981). In holding that the extradition
treaty benefited the signatories only, these courts reasoned similarly to courts
which have denied standing to defendants in cases involving the principle of

specialty.
57. See, e.g., Sensi, 879 F.2d at 892 n.1; United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d
994, 1009 n.5 (5th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, 874 F.2d 242 (1989) (per curiam);
United States ex reL Cabrera v. Warden, Metro. Correctional Ctr., 629 F. Supp.
699, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
58. See Kaufman, 874 F.2d at 243 ("The State Department has indicated
its approval of the denial to the Franks of the benefits of the rule of specialty
contained in the treaty between the United States and Mexico since 'only an
offended nation can complain about the purported violation of an extradition
treaty,' and Mexico has made no protest .... ).
59. United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1283, 1297 (3d Cir. 1991); United
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have held that if the surrendering state acquiesces to the trial
of the defendant on additional charges, the defendant cannot
raise an objection.60
The courts' current analysis of the principle of specialty is
both perfunctory and internally inconsistent. This treatment
belies the importance of the principle of specialty and its underlying objectives.
A.

UNITED STATES V. RAUSCHER

In the seminal opinion on the principle of specialty, United
States v. Rauscher,61 the United States Supreme Court established that specialty applies to criminal proceedings in the
United States. In Rauscher, the United States asked Great
Britain to extradite William Rauscher, a sailor on an American
ship, for the murder of a crew member.62 After Great Britain
extradited Rauscher, the United States convicted him of assault
and infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. 63 The Court
held that prosecuting Rauscher in violation of the principle of
specialty suggested "an implication of fraud upon the rights of
the party extradited, and of bad faith to the country which permitted his extradition." 64 Although Great Britain did not expressly protest Rauscher's conviction, the Court presumed that
it objected.65 Accordingly, Rauscher could be tried only for
murder, the charge for which he had been extradited.6 6
The Court explicitly stated in Rauscher's companion case,
States v. Levy, 905 F.2d 326, 328 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 759
(1991); United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 (1lth Cir. 1989); United States

v. Thinion, 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d
1420, 1422 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).

60. See Riviere, 924 F.2d at 1300-1301 (holding that as a sovereign, the surrendering state may waive its right to object to a treaty violation and that defendants have no standing to object to such an action); Najohn, 785 F.2d at
1422 (" '[IThe extradited party may be tried for a crime other than that for
which he was surrendered f the asylum country consents."' (quoting Berenguer v. Vance, 473 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (D.D.C. 1979))).

61. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
62. I& at 408.
63. Id. at 409. The extradition treaty listed murder as an extraditable offense, but not the charges for which Rauscher was convicted. Id. at 411. The
Court termed those charges "of a very unimportant character when compared
with that of murder." I&i at 432.
64. Id. at 422.
65. Id. at 415-16. Although the Rauscher Court did not address whether
the surrendering state can waive specialty, the deference it showed to the interests of the surrendering state, see id,, suggests that it may have allowed it.
66. Id at 430.
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Ker v. Illinois, that an individual extradited pursuant to a
treaty has enforceable rights. 67 The Ker Court held that the
relevant extradition treaty did not apply because the defendant
had been abducted rather than extradited. 68 The Court distinguished Rauscher on the grounds that Rauscher "came to this
country clothed with the protections which the nature of such
[extradition] proceedings and the true construction of the
treaty gave him. ''69 When read together, Rauscher and Ker establish that extradition treaties provide enforceable rights to
both surrendering states and defendants.
This reasoning supports the position that the surrendering
state may require the requesting state to satisfy its procedural
requirements before granting extradition.7" Informing defendants of all charges against them permits them to use the surrendering states' safeguards to avoid extradition for an offense
which they did not commit. Without this protection requesting
states may dupe surrendering states and defendants by thwarting the defendants' opportunity to avoid extradition. Defendants should thus have standing to protest and avoid prosecution
under the principle of specialty.
Rauscher is still a leading case on specialty. Courts frequently cite Rauscher in support of the proposition that defendants have standing to challenge proceedings which violate the
principle of specialty.7 1 Courts which hold that the principle of
72
specialty has not been violated carefully distinguish Rauscher.
67. 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886).
68. 1& at 438. The Court affirmed Ker's conviction, giving birth to the
Ker-Frisbiedoctrine that a court will not inquire into how in personam jurisdiction over a defendant was obtained. See id., at 440; Frisbie v. Collins, 342
U.S. 519, 522 (1954). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a kidnapping case to be heard this term. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946
F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), cert. granted,112 S. Ct. 857 (1992). The
United States sponsored the abduction of the defendant, a Mexican. Id. at
1466-67. Mexico protested the abduction and demanded the return of the defendant. Id at 1467.
69. Ker, 119 U.S. at 443. Ker is often incorrectly cited as standing for the
proposition that defendants do not have rights under the treaty. See e.g.,
United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1301 (3d Cir. 1991).
70. When the United States is the surrendering state, the defendant must
receive an extradition hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988). A magistrate must determine whether the defendant is the person the requesting state is seeking,
whether all requirements of extradition are satisfied, and whether the defendant was convicted of the crime or whether the evidence presented establishes
probable cause. 6 MARJORIE M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
944-45 (1968).
71. See e.g., Riviere, 924 F.2d at 1297-98.
72. See e.g., United States v. Sensi, 879 F.2d 888, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (The
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B. THE REASONING OF CoURTS DENYING STANDING
Courts which deny defendants standing reason that because the principle of specialty exists to protect only the surrendering state, only the surrendering state may insist on strict
adherence to specialty. Some courts following this positivist approach have indicated that the defendant would have had
standing had the surrendering state objected to the treaty
violation.1
The Second Circuit has long been in the vanguard of courts
holding that the principle of specialty exists for the benefit of
surrendering states, not defendants. In Fiocconi v. Attorney
General of the United States, the Second Circuit refused to consider a defendant's protest under the principle of specialty.7 4
The court stated that the basis for the principle "was to prevent
the United States from violating international obligations,"'' 5
and presumed that, absent an "affirmative protest," Italy would
not "regard the prosecution of [the defendants] for subsequent
offenses of the same character as the crime for they were extradited as a breach of faith by the United States. '76 The court
distinguished Fiocconi from Rauscher by concluding that unlike Great Britain, Italy could not be presumed to object to the
prosecution 77 Under the Second Circuit's approach, unless the
surrendering state protests, courts will allow the prosecution of
defendants for crimes related to those listed in the extradition
order.
Other courts which have denied defendants enforceable
rights have neither distinguished Rauscher nor explained why
it was not necessary to do so. In United States v. Kaufman, the
court denied the defendant's petition for a rehearing on the
grounds that the defendant lacked standing to protest a viola5 In reaching this conclusion,
tion of the principle of specialty71
Rauscher Court did not "hold the indictment invalid simply because it charged
a crime denominated differently from the crime charged before the British
Magistrate. Rather, Rauscher held that the indictment was invalid because it
charged the defendant with a crime not enumerated in the treaty."). This
analysis is only partially correct. The Rauscher Court discussed both specialty
and the requirement of extraditable offenses, but, because they are separate,
either would have sufficed.
73. See e.g., United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974, 979 (S.D.N.Y 1987).
74. 462 F.2d 475, 476 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1059 (1972).
75. Id-at 480.
76. Id at 481.
77. IdE
78. 874 F.2d 242, 243 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
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the court relied on the State Department's position. 79 In
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, the defendant raised the principle of
specialty as a defense.8 0 Although the court could have explained that it could not rule on a prospective violation of the
principle of specialty, it simply stated that because specialty
protected only the surrendering state, the defendant could not
8
raise the challenge. '

C. THE REASONING OF COURTS GRANTNG STANDING
Courts that grant defendants standing generally allow individuals only derivative standing (the defendant is allowed to
raise the specialty violations on behalf of the surrendering state
rather than as a right of the defendant's).8 2 These courts presume that the surrendering state objects to the treaty violation
even if it is silent.83 In some cases, the courts did not need to
determine whether specialty was violated because the surrendering state waived its application.84
In United States v. Najohn, for example, the Ninth Circuit
cited Rauscher in holding that the defendant could raise the
surrendering state's objections to the violation of the principle
of specialty.8 5 The court reasoned that because the extradition
process required the cooperation of the surrendering state, the
requesting state had to keep any promises it had made to se79.
80.

Id.
776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).

81. Id at 584.
82. E.g., United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 721 (11th Cir.) (holding that
defendants "can raise only those objections to the extradition process that the
surrendering country might consider a breach of the extradition treaty"), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 921 (1989).
83. The Ninth Circuit, for example, presumes that the surrendering state
objects to the requesting state's prosecution or punishment of the defendant
when it has not granted the requesting state the right to do so. It summed up
its position in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1355 n.13 (9th
Cir. 1991), petitionfor cert filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3378 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1991) (No. 91670):
[O]nce there has been a formal extradition proceeding in the requested nation, that nation's agreement to extradite only on specific
charges must be construed as the equivalent of a formal objection to
his trial on other charges. Thus, in specialty cases we do not require
an additional formal protest before permitting the defendant to raise
the objections of the requested nation. The contrary rule... is apparently based on the view that a specific official protest is required after
the defendant has been extradited to ensure that the government of
the requested nation has not changed its mind and that it still wishes
to assert the objection it previously entertained.
84. E.g., United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1301 n.13 (3d Cir. 1991).
85. 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).
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cure the extradition. 86 Enforcing the requesting state's promise
would thus preserve the "institution of extradition."8 7
III. EFFECTIVE TREATY ENFORCEMENT
A.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

A solution to the problem of standing in specialty cases
must further treaty enforcement and maximize the protection
of the rights of all involved parties. To accomplish this, this
Note proposes that both surrendering states and defendants be
able to enforce the principle of specialty fully, but that only
surrendering states be permitted to waive it. When the surrendering state chooses to expand the extradition order, the court
would find no specialty violation. This retroactive waiver
would nullify any specialty grounds on which a defendant could
object.
1.

Objection by the Surrendering State

The surrendering state's objection may be either express or
implied. If the objection is express, the defendant should have
standing to seek the dismissal of the disputed charges. Permitting the prosecution to continue while the surrendering state
presses its claim on the international level undermines the effectiveness of an extradition treaty between the surrendering
and requesting states.
The surrendering state may also remain silent on the purported treaty violation. As the Supreme Court did in Rauscher,
courts should presume that a silent state objects and grant defendants standing to pursue a specialty defense. Instead of
gauging whether the surrendering state would object, as with
derivative standing, under this proposal a court would look at
the substance of the claim. If none of the exceptions or limitations to specialty apply,8 the court would simply determine
whether the charge in question was listed in the extradition order. This rule would ensure that requesting states comply with
the treaty, and in particular, with the surrendering state's restrictions on the grant of extradition.
86. I&
87. I&
88. See supra part I.B.2.
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Consent by the Surrendering State to the Additional
Charges

Under this Note's proposal, requesting states could proceed
in prosecuting defendants for crimes for which they were not
extradited only if they first secured a waiver from the surrendering state. If the surrendering state did not object to the additional charges, it could waive the application of the principle
of specialty by expanding the extradition order. 89
Because allowing defendants to waive the application of
the principle of specialty would nullify the protections treaties
afford surrendering states, defendants should not be able to do
so. Moreover, allowing defendants to waive specialty would
create an unhealthy tension between the extradition processes
and defendants' rights to a fair trial because it would be difficult to ensure that a defendant had knowingly and willingly
waived specialty's protection. °
3. Application of the Model to the Davis Case
In Davis, discussed at the beginning of this Note, the defendant claimed that he was punished for tax fraud, a crime for
89. Ideally, the surrendering state and the requesting state will structure
the procedures for expanding the extradition order to minimize direct political
influences. Courts can minimize political influences by requiring the expansion of the extradition order to come from the same organ within the surrendering state that originally had the authority to grant the extradition request.
For example, if the surrendering state's procedures require some level of judicial scrutiny, absent such scrutiny diplomatic notes from the executive branch
would not suffice. This procedure must be simple enough that the courts of
one state will not need to examine the political workings of another. There
are practical problems, however, with not permitting a political branch of the
surrendering state to expand the extradition order. First, the defendant must
be able to secure a personal judicial hearing in the surrendering state. Second,
it involves courts in foreign affairs, and the executive branch is the United
States's voice for foreign affairs. Third, the accepted rule is that the executive
or political branch has authority to waive the principle of specialty. This authority may even be incorporated in a treaty. See e.g., Treaty on Extradition,
Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, art. XVI, T.I.A.S. No. 10,837, at 16 (stating that when
the United States is the surrendering state, the executive branch has the
power to expand the extradition order).
90. An inherent weakness of the principle of specialty is that it may be
difficult for surrendering states to ascertain whether the requesting state in effect tried the defendant for more crimes than it listed in the extradition order.
For example, the requesting may try the defendant for a common crime, but
punish him or her for both the common crime and another crime for which
extradition could not have been obtained, such as a political offense or a crime
not listed in the treaty as extraditable. See IvAN A. SHEARER, EXTRADION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 188-89 (1971).
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which he was not extradited. If Israel had objected to the violation of the principle of specialty, the United States would have
been obliged to comply with the treaty. However, had Israel
neither objected to nor waived the purported treaty violation,
the court nevertheless would have presumed that Israel had objected and Davis would have had standing to raise the specialty
issue. The court would then have had to decide whether any
exceptions or limitations to specialty applied,91 and, if not,
whether Davis was being tried or punished for a charge for
which the surrendering state had not agreed to extradite him.
If his prosecution did violate specialty, the court would have
had to ensure that the United States complied with the treaty.
Israel could have recognized the violation and cured it by expanding its extradition order. The court would give this action
full retroactive effect, thus nullifying Davis's grounds for
objection.
B.

RATIONALES FOR ALLOWING DEFENDANTS TO ENFORCE
EXTRADITION TREATIES

Extradition treaties and the extradition process itself are
the result of bargaining, much like a business contract. Entering into an extradition treaty limits the sovereignty of the ratifying states by restricting the conditions under which the
requesting state may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant
and under which the surrendering state may grant asylum.92
Although the ratifying states may not intend to make defendants beneficiaries of the agreement, granting them standing to
protest treaty violations is the most effective and efficient
method of ensuring that the parties comply with their contractual transactions. 93
Moreover, this approach is consistent with Supreme Court
precedent. Although the Court has not decided many specialty
cases, its approach in United States v. Rauscher" still controls.
Rauscher grants defendants standing to protest specialty viola91. See supra part I.B.2.
92. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 16, at 135.
93. The principle of specialty grants defendants "immunity" for any
crimes they committed before they were extradited and which were not listed
in the extradition request. While specialty thus also benefits the defendant, it

"upholds the contractual nature of the agreement between the two states in
that the requesting state has to accept that the asylum state has granted extradition for the specified offenses and no others." GILBERT, supra note 43, at

106.
94. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
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tions and permits courts to presume that a surrendering state
would object to any violation.
1. Political Factors
Political factors militate against placing the burden of
treaty enforcement solely on the surrendering state and dictate
that defendants should have standing to protest treaty violations.95 Given the conflicting interests of the ratifying states
and the political pressures on them to extradite, surrendering
states may not protest a treaty violation, especially if it is minor
or questionable. 6 The victims of this lack of protest are the
sovereignty of the surrendering state, the extradition process itself, and the interests of the defendant. The defendant, however, is the party best suited to ensure compliance with the
treaty.
2.

Efficient Treaty Enforcement

Efficiency dictates that defendants must have standing to
enforce treaties. If only the surrendering state had standing to
protest specialty violations, it would need to keep track of all
relevant proceedings.9 The surrendering state would then
have to examine the current proceedings against the defendant.
To do so, it would have to compare the charges in question to
the charges listed in the extradition order, while considering
the exceptions and limitations to specialty, to determine
whether the extradition treaty was violated. The surrendering
state would want to have a solid foundation for asserting that
95. The desire to smooth international relations may cause states to go to
great lengths to extradite prisoners to each other. For example, Joseph Doherty, an alleged Irish Republican Army terrorist, sought political asylum with
the backing of Congress and New York City Mayor David Dinkins. The State
Department, however, sought to extradite Doherty, asserting before the
Supreme Court that granting asylum to Doherty would damage the United
States's relations with the United Kingdom. Wade Lambert, ExtraditionAgony: The Drawn-OutCase of an Irish GuerillaReaches High Court, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 17, 1991, at Al, A14.
96. Because the only practical remedies for the surrendering state are to
lodge a diplomatic protest or to deny the next extradition request, either of
which may create or heighten political tension between the countries, it is unlikely to protest the more routine treaty violations.

97. See United States v. Watts, 14 F. 130, 140 (D. Cal. 1882). In addition, it

is hardly practical for the surrendering state to rely on notice from the defendant. A defendant may be willing to waive the protection of specialty, but even
if he or she desires the protections of the treaty, "the poor and obscure offender might have no means of drawing the attention of the government." Id

1992]
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the requesting state had violated the treaty, but its investigation might make any protest untimely.
When the surrendering state complains to the requesting
state that it has violated the treaty, it is asserting that the requesting state has violated international law. If the surrendering state is unable to achieve satisfaction, it may take
responsive steps. The most natural course for the surrendering
state at this step would be to refuse further extraditions under
the treaty in question-thus effectively undermining the treaty.
In light of the parameters clearly established by the surrendering state's earlier grant of extradition, these extra efforts
by the surrendering state are unnecessary. By agreeing to allow trial only on certain charges, the surrendering state conditioned the grant of extradition on compliance with the principle
of specialty. The political pressures on the surrendering state
and the efforts it must make to follow and evaluate the proceedings and protest the violation of specialty discourage it
from going to the lengths required to protest cases in which the
violation seems marginal or questionable.
Because the requesting state has already promised the surrendering state that it will act in a certain way toward the defendant, requiring extra efforts by the surrendering state to
ensure this compliance is inefficient. It would be more efficient
to allow the defendant, a uniquely interested party, to bring the
issue before the court, the body best able to determine whether
the principle of specialty has been violated.
CONCLUSION
The principles underlying specialty dictate that violations
cannot be made to wait for the surrendering state to protest. If
the surrendering state is indifferent or has more pressing matters to which it must attend, the violations will go unimpeded
unless the defendant has enforceable specialty rights. The
losers will be the extradition process and human rights. Affording defendants standing to protest the treaty violations is
the most certain way to minimize the danger of unjust decisions
and to ensure that international law is enforced.

